Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution
Open accessAbstract
The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
There is debate about the presence or possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals, neural organoids, AI systems, and xenobots.
“There is also debate about the presence or possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals [16 -21], neural organoids [22 -24], AI systems [25 -29], and xenobots [30,31].”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Consciousness today has a number of different adaptive functions in different domains.
“Consciousness today has a number of different adaptive functions in different domains, which is to be expected given that consciousness now has a large number of different dimensions [4,5].”
From The social origins of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [5]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 110 · Cited by 78
- Authors
- Dung, L., & Newen, A.
- Affiliations
- Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Dung, Leonard
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2023-06
- Volume
- 235
- Pages
- 105409
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4321442027
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 110
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 6
- FWCI
- 20.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (GRK 2185/2)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Primate Behavior and Ecology
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- animal consciousness, cognitive ability
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Consciousness, Learning, Problem Solving
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review