The self in action: lessons from delusions of control
Abstract
Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of it. Most of the time we are not aware of the sensory consequences of our actions or of the various subtle corrections that we make during the course of goal-directed actions. We know that we are agents and that we are successfully causing the world to change. But as actors we move through the world like shadows glimpsed only occasional from the corner of an eye.
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The comparator model has been used to account for the sense of agency, where inference about endogenous control over the causes of sensory signals underpins the sense that an action is agentive or self-generated.
“Subsequently, the comparator model has been used to account for the sense of agency (Feinberg 1978; Frith 2005; David et al. 2008), where inference about endogenous control over the causes of sensory signals is thought to underpin the sense that an action is agentive or self-generated.”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Frith 2005
The more sensory prediction error is generated, the more likely it is that an action or thought has external as opposed internal or endogenous causes.
“This means that the more sensory prediction error is generated, the more likely it is that an action or thought has external as opposed internal or endogenous causes (Frith 2005; Corlett et al. 2019).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Frith 2005
The symptomatology of schizophrenia-such as thought insertion-has been understood in terms of a failure of sensory attenuation mechanisms.
“For instance, the symptomatology of schizophrenia—such as thought insertion, where patients report feeling that their thoughts are not their own—have been understood in terms of a failure of these sensory attenuation mechanisms (Ford and Mathalon 2005; Frith 2005; Rösler et al. 2015; Thakkar et al. 2021).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Frith 2005
The TPJ has been implicated in self-other discriminations based on perceptual, cognitive, and motor cues.
“as well as self-other discriminations based on perceptual, cognitive, and motor cues (Farrer et al., 2003;Frith, 2005).”
From Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-parietal cortex support self-location and first-person perspective (2011) · cites this paper as Frith, 2005
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References 81 · Cited by 315
- Authors
- Frith, C.
- Affiliations
- UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Frith, Chris
- ORCID
- Frith, Chris
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 752-770
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2061003036
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 21
- FWCI
- 5.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- delusions of control, agency, action awareness, sensory feedback, motion correction, intentional action, phenomenology of action, goal-directed action
- MeSH terms
- Awareness, Culture, Delusions, Feedback, Humans, Imagination, Movement, Perceptual Disorders, Proprioception, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Self Concept, Visual Perception, Recognition, Psychology
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