Complementary Systems for Understanding Action Intentions
Open accessAbstract
How humans understand the intention of others' actions remains controversial. Some authors have suggested that intentions are recognized by means of a motor simulation of the observed action with the mirror-neuron system [1-3]. Others emphasize that intention recognition is an inferential process, often called "mentalizing" or employing a "theory of mind," which activates areas well outside the motor system [4-6]. Here, we assessed the contribution of brain regions involved in motor simulation and mentalizing for understanding action intentions via functional brain imaging. Results show that the inferior frontal gyrus (part of the mirror-neuron system) processes the intentionality of an observed action on the basis of the visual properties of the action, irrespective of whether the subject paid attention to the intention or not. Conversely, brain areas that are part of a "mentalizing" network become active when subjects reflect about the intentionality of an observed action, but they are largely insensitive to the visual properties of the observed action. This supports the hypothesis that motor simulation and mentalizing have distinct but complementary functions for the recognition of others' intentions.
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Even when action stimuli are presented, intention understanding does not necessarily recruit mirror areas.
“Even when action stimuli are presented, intention understanding does not necessarily recruit mirror areas”
From Mirror neurons: from origin to function (2014) · cites this paper as de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008
The Results and Discussion (page not specified in our copy) show that reflecting on observed actions’ intentions engages mentalizing regions outside the mirror-neuron system. But the paper also reports that the inferior frontal gyrus, a mirror-system area, encodes observed actions’ intentionality automatically. It does not establish that intention understanding occurs without recruiting mirror areas. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredEmbodied representation and meta-representation might not constitute two mutually exclusive processes.
“embodied representation and meta-representation might not constitute two mutually exclusive processes”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as De Lange et al. 2008
ToM and empathy are partially overlapping psychological constructs.
“ToM and empathy are partially overlapping psychological constructs”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as De Lange et al. 2008
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References 28 · Cited by 343
- Authors
- de Lange, F. P., Spronk, M., Willems, R. M., Toni, I., & Bekkering, H.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Venue
- Current Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 454-457
- ISSN
- 0960-9822 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010168163
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 37 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 42.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Current Biology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- mirror neuron system, motor simulation, mentalization, theory of mind, inferior frontal gyrus, social cognition, functional neuroimaging
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Cerebral Cortex, Female, Humans, Male, Motor Activity, Comprehension, Intention
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