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Toward a property rights theory of legal rights for rivers

Talbot-Jones, Julia, Bennett, Jeff · 2019 · Ecological Economics

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.06.007

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Research works printed but not linked: 45

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Metadata

Authors
Talbot-Jones, J., & Bennett, J.
Venue
Ecological Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-10
Volume
164
Pages
106352
ISSN
0921-8009
Cited by
28
References
0
Language
en

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