Conditional cooperation on three continents
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The model's population composition of a small fraction of altruists and the rest conditional cooperators resembles behavioural regularities observed elsewhere.
“The population consists of N agents, with a small fraction consisting of altruists (i.e., agents who cooperate unconditionally), and the rest consisting of conditional cooperators (i.e., agents who are willing to cooperate if others do so); this resembles behavioural regularities observed elsewhere17,81.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [81]
The combination of conditional cooperative criterion values of the agents and noise mimics the behavioural regularities observed in repeated public goods games elsewhere.
“The combination of CCC values of the agents and mimics the behavioural regularities observed in repeated public goods games elsewhere17,81.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [81]
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References 16 · Cited by 387
- Authors
- Kocher, M. G., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R. J., & Sutter, M.
- Affiliations
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Appalachian State University (US)
- Colorado State University (US)
- Universität Innsbruck (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Kroll, Stephan
- Venue
- Economics Letters
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 175-178
- ISSN
- 0165-1765 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124511819
- Cited by
- 387
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 23
- FWCI
- 75.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Economics Letters (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Open access LMU (Ludwid Maxmilian's Universitat Munchen) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Universitätsbibliothek der LMU
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
- Keywords
- conditional cooperation, public goods, cross-national comparison, behavioral patterns, prosocial behavior, United States
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