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Cited by 183

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Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly

Open access
Lambertini, Luca, Tampieri, Alessandro·2015·Economic Modelling

Abstract

This paper investigates how socially responsible behaviour influences firms' profits and social welfare when production entails an environmental externality. We study a Cournot oligopoly with pollution, with one CSR operating in the market. A CSR firm not only takes into account its profits but also internalises its own share of pollution and is sensitive to consumer surplus. With a large enough market, the CSR firm obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors, and induces a higher level of social welfare. The results are confirmed when a socially optimal tax on pollution is adopted. Indeed, even if the environmental concern restrains the production of a CSR firm, the social concern expands it. The second effect more than offsets the first one in a large market, making the CSR production strategy be more aggressive compared to its competitors.

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Metadata

Authors
Lambertini, L., & Tampieri, A.
Venue
Economic Modelling
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2015-11
Volume
50
Pages
40-48
ISSN
0264-9993 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2167116820
Cited by
183
References
2
FWCI
23.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.econmod.2015.05.016
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Lambertini, L., & Tampieri, A. (2015). Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Economic Modelling. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2015.05.016

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.