The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How transparent are central banks?
Open accessAbstract
Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on monetary policy. However, this has been complicated by the fact that transparency is a qualitative concept that is hard to measure. This paper proposes an index for the transparency of monetary policy that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking. The index is compiled for nine major central banks. It is based on a detailed analysis of actual information disclosure and reveals a rich variety in the degree and dynamics of central bank transparency.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Social Value of Public Information
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Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures
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Organizational Transparency: Conceptualizations, Conditions, and Consequences
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Metadata
- Authors
- Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Geraats, P. M.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 0176-2680
- OpenAlex
- W3124695609
- Cited by
- 492
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 72.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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