The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How should grid operators govern smart grid innovation projects? An embedded case study approach
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Other research highlights the role of self-enforced arrangements in fostering long-term stakeholder relations [54] and the need for polycentric governance to manage competitive and cooperative tensions [65].”
From Smart, circular and renewable: The role of cooperative governance in accelerating a sustainable energy transition (2025) · cites this paper as [54]
In the citing paper
“Smart grid innovation projects have been studied as collective action problems since smart grids cannot be realised by one single actor [54].”
From Smart, circular and renewable: The role of cooperative governance in accelerating a sustainable energy transition (2025) · cites this paper as [54]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions Are a Mix of “Market” and “Hierarchy”
Hennart, J.-F. (1993) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.4.4.529 · Cited by 652 · cited 1×
“A specific concern is whether to organize economic activities within or between organizations (Hennart, 1993; Williamson, 1979).”
Background
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 29
- Agrell, 2013, Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization, Energy Policy, 52, 656, 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.026 · DOI
- Clark, 1961, Incentive systems: a theory of organizations, Adm. Sci. Q, 6, 129, 10.2307/2390752 · DOI
- Cohen, 1960, A coefficient of agreement of nominal scales, Educ. Psychol. Meas., 20, 37, 10.1177/001316446002000104 · DOI · Paper page
- De Reuver, 2015, Collective action for mobile payment platforms: a case study on collaboration issues between banks and telecom operators, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl., 14, 331, 10.1016/j.elerap.2014.08.004 · DOI
- Dyer, 1998, The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage, Acad. Manag. Rev., 23, 660, 10.5465/amr.1998.1255632 · DOI
- Giordano, 2012, A business case for smart grid technologies: a systemic perspective, Energy Policy, 40, 252
- Granovetter, 1985, Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness, Am. J. Sociol., 91, 481, 10.1086/228311 · DOI · Paper page
- Gulati, 2000, Strategic networks, Strateg. Manag. J., 21, 203, 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200003)21:3<203::AID-SMJ102>3.0.CO;2-K · DOI
- Hagedoorn, 1993, Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering : interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences, Strateg. Manag. J., 14, 371, 10.1002/smj.4250140505 · DOI · Paper page
- Jones, 1997, A general theory of network governance: exchange conditions and social mechanisms, Acad. Manag. Rev., 10.5465/amr.1997.9711022109 · DOI
- Knoke, 1988, Incentives in collective action organizations, Am. Sociol. Rev., 53, 311, 10.2307/2095641 · DOI
- Kollock, 1998, Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation, Annu. Rev. Sociol., 24, 183, 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · DOI · Paper page
- Li, 2002, Deconstruction of the telecommunications industry: from value chains to value networks, Telecommun. Policy, 26, 10.1016/S0308-5961(02)00056-3 · DOI
- Lopes, 2009, The motives for cooperation in work organizations, J. Inst. Econ.
- Lowndes, 1998, The dynamics of multi-organizational partnerships: an analysis of changing modes of governance, Public Adm., 76, 313, 10.1111/1467-9299.00103 · DOI
- Markus, 2006, Industry-wide information systems standardization as collective action: the case of the U.S. residential mortgage industry, MIS Q, 30, 439, 10.2307/25148768 · DOI
- Monge, 1998, Production of collective action in alliance-based interorganizational communication and information systems, Organ. Sci., 10.1287/orsc.9.3.411 · DOI
- Morgan, M.G., Apt, J., Lave, L.B., Ilic, M.D., Sirbu, M., Peha, J.M., 2009. The many meanings of “Smart Grid. Carnegie Mellon Engineering. · DOI
- Oliver, 1980, Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: theoretical investigations, Am. J. Sociol., 85, 1356, 10.1086/227168 · DOI
- Oliver, 1985, A theory of the critical mass. I. interdependence, group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action, Am. J. Sociol., 10.1086/228313 · DOI
- Ring, 1994, Developmental processes of cooperative interorganisational relationships, Acad. Manag. Rev., 19, 90, 10.5465/amr.1994.9410122009 · DOI
- Sagar, 2006, Technological innovation in the energy sector: R&D, deployment, and learning-by-doing, Energy Policy, 34, 2601, 10.1016/j.enpol.2005.04.012 · DOI
- Salisbury, 1969, An exchange theory of interest groups, Midwest J. Polit. Sci., 13, 1, 10.2307/2110212 · DOI
- Stabell, 1998, Configuring value for competitive advantage: on chains, shops, and networks, Strat. Manag. J., 19, 413, 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199805)19:5<413::AID-SMJ946>3.0.CO;2-C · DOI · Paper page
- Tsang, 2000, Transaction cost and resource-based explanations of joint ventures: a comparison and synthesis, Organ. Stud., 21, 215, 10.1177/0170840600211004 · DOI
- Uzzi, 1997, Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox of embeddedness, Adm. Sci. Q, 42, 35, 10.2307/2393808 · DOI
- Verzijlbergh, 2012, Network impacts and cost savings of controlled EV charging, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 3, 1203, 10.1109/TSG.2012.2190307 · DOI
- Williamson, 1979, Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations, J. Law Econ., 10.1086/466942 · DOI · Paper page
- Zajac, 1993, From transaction cost to transactional value analysis: Implications for the study of interorganizational strategies, J. Manag. Stud., 30, 10.1111/j.1467-6486.1993.tb00298.x · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Van Opstal, W., Bocken, N., & Brusselaers, J. (2025) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2025.104049 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- de Reuver, M., van der Lei, T., & Lukszo, Z.
- Venue
- Energy Policy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-10
- Volume
- 97
- Pages
- 628-635
- ISSN
- 0301-4215
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 2
- Language
- en
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
