Cited by 43Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationGame Theory and Applications

Subtle social cues, explicit incentives, and cooperation in social dilemmas

Open access
Boone, Christophe, Declerck, Carolyn H., Suetens, Sigrid·2008·Evolution and Human Behavior

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.005

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References 67 · Cited by 43

Authors
Boone, C., Declerck, C. H., & Suetens, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Antwerp (BE)
  • Tilburg University (NL)
Corresponding author
Declerck, Carolyn H.
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-05
Volume
29
Issue
3
Pages
179-188
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2148316951
Cited by
43
References
67
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
FWCI
7.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Locations
  • Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • Universiteit Antwerpen
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
cooperation, social cues, incentive structures, social dilemmas, mixed-motive games, repeated games, synergistic effect, social information, teamwork, expectations of others

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