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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Autonomous AI agents might serve as credible commitment devices, enabling actors to carry out actions based on complex conditions and helping solve problems with incomplete contracting.
“Autonomous AI agents themselves might also serve as credible commitment devices (Howard, 1988; McAfee, 1984; Tennenholtz, 2004), enabling actors to carry out actions based on potentially complex conditions and thus helping to solve problems with incomplete contracting (Schmitz, 2001).”
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Tennenholtz, 2004
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Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence
Russell, S., Dewey, D., & Tegmark, M. (2015) · AI Magazine · doi:10.1609/aimag.v36i4.2577 · Cited by 637 · see citing works
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
- Authors
- Tennenholtz, M.
- Affiliations
- Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Tennenholtz, Moshe
- ORCID
- Tennenholtz, Moshe
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 363-373
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4245774394
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 0.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- mutual cooperation, internet economy, agent technology, computational game theory, John von Neumann
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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