The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Accurate modeling of Modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“To simulate the control networks, e.g.Modbus, Allen-Bradley Data Highway, TASSCS uses Opnet tool and to simulate the operation behaviour; it uses PowerWorldi simulation system.”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [106]
In the citing paper
“virtual testbed”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [106]
In the citing paper
“Modbus”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [106]
Citations
Cites
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks
Roesch, M. (1999) · Cited by 3,094
Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite
Bellovin, S. (1989) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/378444.378449 · Cited by 559
Using Model-based Intrusion Detection for SCADA Networks
Cheung, S. W., Dutertre, B., Fong, M. W., Lindqvist, U., Skinner, K., & Valdes, A. (2006) · Cited by 321
On SCADA control system command and response injection and intrusion detection
Gao, W., Morris, T. H., Reaves, B., & Richey, D. (2010) · eCrime Researchers Summit (eCrime) · doi:10.1109/ecrime.2010.5706699 · Cited by 187
Stuxnet, the real start of cyber warfare? [Editor's Note]
Chen, T. (2010) · IEEE Network · doi:10.1109/mnet.2010.5634434 · Cited by 168
A testbed for analyzing security of SCADA control systems (TASSCS)
Mallouhi, M., Al-Nashif, Y., Cox, D., Chadaga, T., & Hariri, S. (2011) · ISGT 2011 · doi:10.1109/isgt.2011.5759169 · Cited by 164
Modbus/DNP3 State-Based Intrusion Detection System
Fovino, I. N., Carcano, A., Murel, T. D. L., Trombetta, A., & Masera, M. (2010) · International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA) · doi:10.1109/aina.2010.86 · Cited by 153
Smart grids, smart cities need better networks [Editor's Note
Chen, T. (2010) · IEEE Network · doi:10.1109/mnet.2010.5430136 · Cited by 138
Tsang, C.-H., & Kwong, S. (2006) · IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT) · doi:10.1109/icit.2005.1600609 · Cited by 107
Communication pattern anomaly detection in process control systems
Valdes, A., & Cheung, S. (2009) · IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST) · doi:10.1109/ths.2009.5168010 · Cited by 106
A testbed for secure and robust SCADA systems
Giani, A., Karsai, G., Roosta, T., Shah, A., Sinopoli, B., & Wiley, J. (2008) · ACM SIGBED Review · doi:10.1145/1399583.1399587 · Cited by 94
Genge, B., Siaterlis, C., Nai Fovino, I., & Masera, M. (2012) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2012.06.015 · Cited by 82
A Simulation Environment for SCADA Security Analysis and Assessment
Wang, C., Fang, L., & Dai, Y. (2010) · International Conference on Measuring Technology and Mechatronics Automation (ICMTMA) · doi:10.1109/icmtma.2010.603 · Cited by 79
Development of the PowerCyber SCADA security testbed
Hahn, A., Kregel, B., Govindarasu, M., Fitzpatrick, J. M., Adnan, R., Sridhar, S., & Higdon, M. (2010) · Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop · doi:10.1145/1852666.1852690 · Cited by 66
Detection, correlation, and visualization of attacks against critical infrastructure systems
Briesemeister, L., Cheung, S., Lindqvist, U., & Valdes, A. (2010) · Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/pst.2010.5593242 · Cited by 44
Intrusion Monitoring in Process Control Systems
Valdes, A., & Cheung, S. (2009) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2009.273 · Cited by 39
Configurable Middleware-Level Intrusion Detection for Embedded Systems
Næss, E., Frincke, D. A., McKinnon, A. D., & Bakken, D. E. (2005) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW) · doi:10.1109/icdcsw.2005.52 · Cited by 18
Development of test-bed and security devices for SCADA communication in electric power system
Kang, D.-J., & Kim, H. (2009) · International Telecommunications Energy Conference (INTELEC) · doi:10.1109/intlec.2009.5351774 · Cited by 10
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- D. Yang, A. Usynin, J. Hines, Anomaly-based intrusion detection for SCADA systems, in: Proceedings of the Fifth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control and Human–Machine Interface Technologies, 2006, pp. 12–16.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
In-vehicle network intrusion detection using deep convolutional neural network
Song, H. M., Woo, J., & Kim, H. K. (2019) · Vehicular Communications · doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100198 · Cited by 595
Challenges and Opportunities in Securing the Industrial Internet of Things
Serror, M., Hack, S., Henze, M., Schuba, M., & Wehrle, K. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2020.3023507 · Cited by 381
“This includes the business case for technical tools (e. g., IDSs and access logs), appropriate resources (e. g., incident response teams), and security training of employees.”
InfluentialA survey of cyber security management in industrial control systems
Knowles, W., Prince, D., Hutchison, D., Disso, J. F. P., & Jones, K. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.02.002 · Cited by 344
“Goldenberg and Wool [86] implement state-based anomaly detection for Modbus/TCP networks using a deterministic finite automaton.”
MethodA Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics
Pliatsios, D., Sarigiannidis, P., Lagkas, T., & Sarigiannidis, A. G. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2987688 · Cited by 320
“Goldenberg and Wool [103] modeled the Modbus communication traffic using Deterministic Finite Automation (DFA).”
MethodArchitecture and security of SCADA systems: A review
Yadav, G., & Paul, K. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100433 · Cited by 261
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A.
- Affiliations
- Tel Aviv University (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Wool, Avishai
- ORCID
- Wool, Avishai
- Venue
- International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-06
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 63-75
- ISSN
- 1874-5482 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089944128
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 39 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 23.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- Modbus TCP, SCADA security, intrusion detection, deterministic finite automata, industrial control network security
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