The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach
Open accessAbstract
This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature, which focuses on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
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Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
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A Content Analysis of Risk Management Disclosures in Canadian Annual Reports
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Cited by
Determinants of narrative risk disclosures in UK interim reports
Elzahar, H., & Hussainey, K. (2012) · The Journal of Risk Finance · doi:10.1108/15265941211203189 · Cited by 404
Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., & Hussainey, K. (2013) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.010 · Cited by 276
Elshandidy, T., & Neri, L. (2015) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12095 · Cited by 262
Risk reporting: A review of the literature and implications for future research✩
Elshandidy, T., Shrives, P. J., Bamber, M., & Abraham, S. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Literature · doi:10.1016/j.acclit.2017.12.001 · Cited by 166
Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts
Ittner, C. D., & Michels, J. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9396-0 · Cited by 111
Metadata
- Authors
- Dobler, M.
- Venue
- The International Journal of Accounting
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 184-206
- ISSN
- 0020-7063 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2135569813
- Cited by
- 239
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 16.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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