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Cited by 151Corruption and Economic DevelopmentTaxation and Compliance StudiesLocal Government Finance and Decentralization

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Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

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Zamboni, Yves, Litschig, Stephan·2018·Journal of Development Economics

Abstract

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in three areas of local government activity in Brazil: procurement, health service delivery and cash transfer targeting. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the share of audited resources involved in corruption in procurement by about 10 percentage points and the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by about 15 percentage points. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services - measured through user satisfaction surveys - or compliance with eligibility requirements for the conditional cash transfer program - measured through household inspections. The observed impact heterogeneity across activities is consistent with differences in potential sanctions and in the probability that a sanction is applied, conditional on detection.

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References 28 · Cited by 151

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  1. Avis, 2017, Do government audits reduce Corruption? Estimating the long-term impacts of exposing corrupt politicians, J. Polit. Econ.

Metadata

Authors
Zamboni, Y., & Litschig, S.
Affiliations
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (BR)
Venue
Journal of Development Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018-09
Volume
134
Pages
133-149
ISSN
0304-3878 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1593408240
Cited by
151
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 8
FWCI
29.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
  • other-oa
  • www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
  • www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Development Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • RECERCAT (Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Keywords
audit risk, rent extraction, corruption, public procurement, health care delivery, conditional cash transfers, targeting, local government, sanctions, user satisfaction, Brazil

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.03.008
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Zamboni, Y., & Litschig, S. (2018). Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.03.008

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