Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery
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Five studies test policies guaranteeing impunity to officials or citizens who report corrupt practices on collusive bribery and extortionary bribery.
“Five studies test the effect of policies guaranteeing impunity to officials or citizens who report corrupt practices (principal witness/leniency treatment/asymmetric liability) on collusive bribery (Abbink & Wu, 2017; Bigoni et al., 2015; Engel et al., 2016; Christofl et al. 2017; Buckenmaier et al., 2018), and extortionary bribery (Abbink et al., 2014).”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Abbink & Wu, 2017
Leniency does not show a significant impact on collusive bribery alone but looks promising when associated with policies that limit agent's and client's exposure to one another, such as staff rotation.
“According to one study, leniency does not show a significant impact on collusive bribery alone but it looks promising when associated with policies that limit agent's and client's exposure to one another, such as staff rotation (Abbink & Wu, 2017).”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Abbink & Wu, 2017
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References 31 · Cited by 80
- Authors
- Abbink, K., & Wu, K.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Wu, Kevin
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-01
- Volume
- 133
- Pages
- 256-272
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125802536
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 26.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- corruption deterrence, bribery, self-report, corruption control, trust
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