The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Good disclosure, bad disclosure
Open accessAbstract
We study real-efficiency implications of disclosing public information in a model with multiple dimensions of uncertainty where market prices convey information to a real decision maker. Paradoxically, when disclosure concerns a variable that the real decision maker cares to learn about, disclosure negatively affects price informativeness, and in markets that are effective in aggregating private information, this negative price-informativeness effect can dominate so that better disclosure negatively impacts real efficiency. When disclosure concerns a variable that the real decision maker already knows much about, disclosure always improves price informativeness and real efficiency. Our analysis has important empirical and policy implications for different contexts such as disclosure of stress test information and regulation of credit ratings.
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Cites
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
The Use of Knowledge in Society
HAYEK, F. (1996) · Knowledge Management and Organisational Design · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-9749-1.50005-3 · Cited by 6,434
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Social Value of Public Information
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024610 · Cited by 1,967
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price
Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., & Jiang, W. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl024 · Cited by 1,490
Self-citationMann, S. C., & O'Hara, M. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329383 · Cited by 1,152
Optimal Release of Information By Firms
DIAMOND, D. W. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02364.x · Cited by 1,102
Cited by
Fake news, disinformation and misinformation in social media: a review
Aïmeur, E., Amri, S., & Brassard, G. (2023) · Social Network Analysis and Mining · doi:10.1007/s13278-023-01028-5 · Cited by 772
The Changing Economics of Knowledge Production
Abis, S., & Veldkamp, L. (2023) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad059 · Cited by 167
Reduction in Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under Prescriptive Disclosure Requirements
Jouvenot, V., & Krueger, P. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3434490 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldstein, I., & Yang, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-01
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 118-138
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125334200
- Cited by
- 338
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 32.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.