Artificial intelligence and financial crises
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In digital markets, AI-driven hyperswitching allows consumers to oscillate costlessly among providers, risking franchise-run dynamics that can destabilize platforms and even financial services.
“In digital markets, AI-driven hyperswitching allows consumers to oscillate costlessly among providers, risking franchise-run dynamics that can destabilize platforms and even financial services (Van Loo, 2019; Danielsson & Uthemann, 2025),”
From Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents (2025) · cites this paper as Danielsson & Uthemann, 2025
Section 2.2.3 (page unavailable) says AI agents can withdraw liquidity faster, making runs more likely and financial markets more fragile; §3.4 likewise describes AI accelerating crisis responses. The paper does not support the specific claim that consumers switch costlessly among digital-market providers or that such switching causes franchise runs or platform instability. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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Research works printed but not linked: 21
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents
de Witt, C. S., Krawiecka, K., Krawczuk, I., Hagag, B., Anderson, W. L., Belcak, P., Bucknall, B., Cai, X., Chopra, A., Cohen, D., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.02077 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Danielsson, J., & Uthemann, A.
- Affiliations
- Systemic Risk Centre (GB)
- ORCID
- Uthemann, Andreas
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Stability
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2025-09
- Volume
- 80
- Pages
- 101453
- ISSN
- 1572-3089 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4413416447
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 17.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Stability (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K002309/1, ES/R009724/1, ES/Y010612/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Digital Transformation in Financial Services
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence, financial crisis, financial stability, leverage, liquidity stress, information opacity, strategic complementarity, AI regulation, game-theoretic model
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