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Cited by 3,668

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Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China

Li, Hongbin, Zhou, Li-An·2005·Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical findings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theoretical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government officials in promoting local economic growth.

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Metadata

Authors
Li, H., & Zhou, L.-A.
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2005-09
Volume
89
Issue
9-10
Pages
1743-1762
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2030576955
Cited by
3,668
References
0
FWCI
75.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009
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Li, H., & Zhou, L.-A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.