The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of nature and political economy
Open accessAbstract
To say that the level of fatalities resulting from an earthquake is inversely related to a country's per capita level of income is hardly novel. What makes our approach novel is that we relate fatalities to both per capita income and the level of inequality that exists within a country through their joint impact on the likelihood of collective action being taken to mitigate the destructive potential of quakes. We first develop a theoretical model which offers an explanation as to why, in some environments, different segments of society prove incapable of arriving at what all parties perceive to be an agreeable distribution of the burden of the necessary collective action, causing the relatively wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while leaving the relatively poor to its mercy. Following this, we test our theoretical model by evaluating 269 large earthquakes occurring worldwide, between 1960 and 2002, taking into account other factors that influence a quake's destructiveness such as its magnitude, depth and proximity to population centers. Using a Negative Binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators, we find strong evidence of the theoretical model's predictions. That is, while earthquakes themselves are natural phenomena beyond the reach of humankind, our collective inaction with respect to items like the creation and enforcement of building codes, failure to retrofit structures and to enact quake-sensitive zoning clearly plays a part in determining the actual toll that a given quake takes. And, it is through these and other examples of collective inaction that limited per capita income and inequality couple together with a given quake's natural destructive power in determining the actual fatalities resulting from a quake.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118470 · Cited by 4,406
Clausulas comparativas do portugues
Romualdo, J. D. A. (1975) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 4,339
Is Inequality Harmful for GrowthPreprint
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1993) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,648
Income distribution, political instability, and investment
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00030-5 · Cited by 2,303
Where did all the growth go? external shocks, social conflict, and growth collapses
Rodrik, D. (1999) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1009863208706 · Cited by 1,869 · cited 2×
“investment levels (Alesina and Perotti (1996)) and limit a country’s ability to effectively respond to external shocks ( Rodrik (1999) ).”
BackgroundNew ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1998) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(98)00099-6 · Cited by 1,704
Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?Preprint
Allan Drazen, Y., & Alesina, A. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,691
Bénabou, R. (1996) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/654291 · Cited by 1,587
Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1993) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4486 · Cited by 1,436
(2006) · The Elgar Companion to Development Studies · doi:10.4337/9781847202864.00031 · Cited by 1,269
Disaster insurance protection: Public policy lessons
Kunreuther, H. C. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 777
Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3599 · Cited by 684
Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00096-4 · Cited by 656
The Public Health Consequences of Disasters
Noji, E. K. (2000) · Prehospital and Disaster Medicine · doi:10.1017/s1049023x00025255 · Cited by 607
How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru
McMillan, J., & Zoido, P. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330042632690 · Cited by 475
Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth
Bertola, G. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3851 · Cited by 377
The Public Health Consequences of Disasters
(1996) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195095708.001.0001 · Cited by 164
Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions
Hogarth, R. M., & Kunreuther, H. C. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 131
How to Subvert Democracy: Montesions in PeruPreprint
McMillan, J., & Zoido, P. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.548462 · Cited by 90
Cited by
Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2007) · Annals of the Association of American Geographers · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.2007.00563.x · Cited by 1,256
Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid
Strömberg, D. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.199 · Cited by 652
Strobl, E. (2012) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.12.002 · Cited by 445
Does rising income increase or decrease damage risk from natural disasters?
Kellenberg, D. K., & Mobarak, A. M. (2008) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2007.05.003 · Cited by 351
The Economics of Natural Disasters: A Survey
Cavallo, E. A., & Noy, I. (2009) · doi:10.18235/0010924 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Anbarci, N., Escaleras, M., & Register, C. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 1907-1933
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117200072
- Cited by
- 396
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 25.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.