Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
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Retaliation can significantly dampen the effects of asymmetric treatment (impunity to bribe-givers).
“However, this study also shows that retaliation can significantly dampen the effects of the asymmetric treatment.”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Abbink et al. (2014)
When impunity is guaranteed to bribe-givers, reporting increases and demands for bribes decrease; this effect persists even when bribes were not refunded after prosecution, indicating intrinsic motivation was the main driver of citizens' reporting behavior.
“With regard to extortionary corruption, the study of Abbink et al. (2014) shows that, when impunity is guaranteed to bribe‐givers, reporting increases and demands for bribes decrease. This effect persists even when bribes were not refunded after the prosecution, showing that intrinsic motivation was the main driver of citizens' reporting behavior.”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Abbink et al. (2014)
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References 50 · Cited by 132
- Authors
- Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T.
- Affiliations
- Franklin & Marshall College (US)
- Monash University (AU)
- Indian School of Business (IN)
- Corresponding author
- Jain, Tarun
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-03
- Volume
- 111
- Pages
- 17-28
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3022177383
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 50
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 52.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
- Digital Eprints Services at ISB (DESI) (Indian School of Business) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Monash University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- corruption, retaliation, economic incentives, anti-corruption policy
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