False data attack models, impact analyses and defense strategies in the electricity grid
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Potential consequences of cyberattacks include data theft, power theft, denial of power supply, disruption of normal energy system operation, and even destruction of equipment.
“Potential consequences of cyberattacks include data theft, power theft, denial of power supply, disruption of normal energy system operation, and even destruction of equipment [27,29,166].”
From Energy system resilience – A review (2021) · cites this paper as [27]
Cites
Power system reliability evaluation with SCADA cybersecurity considerations
Zhang, Y., Wang, L., Xiang, Y., & Ten, C.-W. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2396994 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Energy system resilience – A review
Jasiūnas, J., Lund, P. D., & Mikkola, J. (2021) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2021.111476 · Cited by 412 · see citing works
“Potential consequences of cyberattacks include data theft, power theft, denial of power supply, disruption of normal energy system operation, and even destruction of equipment [27,29,166].”
Background
- Authors
- Liu, X., & Li, Z.
- Affiliations
- Illinois Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Li, Zuyi
- Venue
- The Electricity Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-05
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 35-42
- ISSN
- 1040-6190 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2619266755
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 3.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Electricity Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- false data injection attacks, cyber attacks on power systems, attack models, impact analysis, defense strategy, power system security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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