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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

Dehaene, S · 2001 · Cognition

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 128 of the 129 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we sub…

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2

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Metadata

Authors
Dehaene, S.
Affiliations
Inserm (FR)
Corresponding author
Dehaene, S
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2001-04
Volume
79
Issue
1-2
Pages
1-37
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2144895779
Cited by
2,498
References
129
Citations by year
2026: 143 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 122 · 2023: 100 · 2022: 104 · 2021: 101 · 2020: 174 · 2019: 213 · 2018: 110 · 2017: 102 · 2016: 86 · 2015: 111 · 2014: 124 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 96
FWCI
43.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
consciousness, global neuronal workspace theory, unconscious processes, attention, top-down attention, information maintenance, intentional action, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, theory of consciousness
MeSH terms
Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Humans, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2
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Dehaene, S. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2

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