Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 128 of the 129 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we sub…
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“Global neuronal workspace theory (GNW) posits that what we subjectively experience as a conscious state, at any given moment, is the global broadcasting and amplification of information [17] across an interconnected network of prefrontal-parietal areas and many distant high-level sensory cortical areas [18–20].”
From An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory (2023) · cites this paper as [20]
In the citing paper
“Consequently, at present, examples of theories that arguably meet the two criteria include recurrent processing theory (RPT) [ 24 -26], GWT [ 22,23,27,28], higher-order theories (HOT) [ 29 -31], and attention schema theory (AST) [ 32,33].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
In the citing paper
“For example, global workspace theory (GWT) identi fi es consciousness with the global broadcast of information to many neurocognitive modules, allowing integration between them [ 22,23].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
In the citing paper
“GWT can arguably also be included since Dehaene and Naccache list 'intentional behavior' together with 'durable and explicit information maintenance' and 'novel combinations of operations ' as a 'type of mental activity speci fi cally associated with consciousness' [ 23].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
In the citing paper
“A neurobiology-inspired version of the GWT was later proposed as the GNWT.6,28,59,60 It takes the same functional concept of a global workspace but links it to specific brain networks and neuronal characteristics.”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [60]
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Cites
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Cited by
Working memory: Looking back and looking forward
Baddeley, A. (2003) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1201 · Cited by 5,200
The economy of brain network organization
Bullmore, E., & Sporns, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3214 · Cited by 3,284
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
“Dehaene and Naccache (2001) postulate that ''this global availability of information (.) is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state.''”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationSmallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.946 · Cited by 2,067
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dehaene, S.
- Affiliations
- Inserm (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Dehaene, S
- ORCID
- Dehaene, S
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 1-37
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2144895779
- Semantic Scholar
- cc21e91142c5393734757f063be22036389730cf
- Cited by
- 2,498
- References
- 129
- Citations by year
- 2026: 143 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 122 · 2023: 100 · 2022: 104 · 2021: 101 · 2020: 174 · 2019: 213 · 2018: 110 · 2017: 102 · 2016: 86 · 2015: 111 · 2014: 124 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 96
- FWCI
- 43.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- consciousness, global neuronal workspace theory, unconscious processes, attention, top-down attention, information maintenance, intentional action, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, theory of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Humans, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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