Towards a unifying neural theory of social cognition
Abstract
Humans can effortlessly understand a lot of what is going on in other peoples' minds. Understanding the neural basis of this capacity has proven quite difficult. Since the discovery of mirror neurons, a number of successful experiments have approached the question of how we understand the actions of others from the perspective of sharing their actions. Recently we have demonstrated that a similar logic may apply to understanding the emotions and sensations of others. Here, we therefore review evidence that a single mechanism (shared circuits) applies to actions, sensations and emotions: witnessing the actions, sensations and emotions of other individuals activates brain areas normally involved in performing the same actions and feeling the same sensations and emotions. We propose that these circuits, shared between the first (I do, I feel) and third person perspective (seeing her do, seeing her feel) translate the vision and sound of what other people do and feel into the language of the observers own actions and feelings. This translation could help understand the actions and feelings of others by providing intuitive insights into their inner life. We propose a mechanism for the development of shared circuits on the basis of Hebbian learning, and underline that shared circuits could integrate with more cognitive functions during social cognitions.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Recent theories of social cognition suggest that cortical areas related to MSA and mirror neuron system structures related to SRs should both be engaged when perceivers make inferences about target states.
“Recent theories of social cognition recognize this likelihood and suggest that cortical areas related to MSA and mirror neuron system structures related to SRs should both be engaged when perceivers make inferences about target states (20, 28, 29).”
From The neural bases of empathic accuracy (2009) · cites this paper as [29]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 148 · Cited by 367
- Authors
- Keysers, C., & Gazzola, V.
- Affiliations
- University Medical Center Groningen (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Keysers, Christian
- Venue
- Progress in Brain Research
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 156
- Pages
- 379-401
- ISSN
- 0079-6123 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112948561
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 148
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 64.90
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Progress in brain research (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- social cognition, mirror neurons, theory of mind, action understanding, emotional understanding, first-person perspective, third-person perspective, Hebbian learning, neural basis of social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Brain, Cognition, Emotions, Empathy, Humans, Models, Neurological, Psychological Theory, Social Behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review