Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,456

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels

Open access
Core, John, Guay, Wayne·1999·Journal of Accounting and Economics
DOI 10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

We predict and find that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives. We model optimal equity incentive levels for CEOs, and use the residuals from this model to measure deviations between CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives and optimal levels. We find that grants of new incentives from options and restricted stock are negatively related to these deviations. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms set optimal equity incentive levels and grant new equity incentives in a manner that is consistent with economic theory.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 2 references

Cited by

See all 1,456

Metadata

Authors
Core, J., & Guay, W.
Venue
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1999-12
Volume
28
Issue
2
Pages
151-184
ISSN
0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1
OpenAlex
W3124737373
Cited by
1,456
References
2
FWCI
84.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1
The paper
Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999). The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.