Traditional medicine, professional monopoly and structural interests: a Korean case

Abstract

Oriental medicine (OM) is a widely practised traditional healing modality across the East Asian countries. The typical operating mode of traditional medicine in the region is characterized by a relatively stable, though asymmetrical, relationship with the biomedically-oriented health care system with a varying degree of collaboration. The present paper looks at the major conflict between OM and pharmacy in South Korea in the 1990s. Most of the discussions over the so-called 'Hanyak Punjaeng'(OM vs pharmacy dispute) have so far been carried out in the perspective of interest/pressure group politics. But this paper presents an alternative analysis about the genesis, process and resolution of the dispute. It is argued that Robert Alford's 'structural interests' model, rather than the conventional pluralist perspective, offers the most plausible explanation of the conflict. Three key findings are ascertained. First, a sectional, inter-professional conflict can erupt into a major social cataclysm beyond the confines of health care services, an unlikely incident of a 'low politics' case becoming a 'high politics' affair. Second, a bipartite professional monopoly based on the principle of professional credentialism came to be established. Third, the dispute brought about a notable change in the structural power distribution between the corporate rationalizer and professional monopolist.