The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market
Open accessAbstract
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision. We present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition, increasing prices or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers. The models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government-subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 1×
“Under the alternative assumption, the lender's return i z - e on a given loan size (z) would not be everywhere monotone increasing in the interest rate, which, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Williamson (1987), can generate equilibrium credit rationing, What is important to note here is that the lender's only motiv…”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“5 For instance, Lipton and Toye (1989), pp.”
BackgroundAgricultural finance and rural credit in poor countries
Lipton, M. (1976) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(76)90065-6 · Cited by 88
Cited by
Morduch, J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1569 · Cited by 2,360
‘Do rural banks matter? Evidence from the Indian social banking experiment’
Burgess, R., & Pande, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201242 · Cited by 1,480
“…interest rate ceilings in the formal sector, led to financial dualism wherein formal subsidized funds are concentrated in the hands of the powerful few and terms in the informal markets (on which the poor depend) worsened (see Adams et al 1984; Braverman and Guasch 1986; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998).”
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Self-citationAccess to Financial Services: A Review of the Issues and Public Policy Objectives
Claessens, S. (2006) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/lkl004 · Cited by 675
Chapter 7 Growth Theory through the Lens of Development Economics
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01007-5 · Cited by 420
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoff, K., & Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Development Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 429-462
- ISSN
- 0304-3878 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2129968354
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 11.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Hoff, K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1997). Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market. Journal of Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(96)00443-9
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