The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 38
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fenn, G. W., & Liang, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 45-72
- ISSN
- 0304-405X
- Cited by
- 559
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
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