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Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games
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“attacking rivals who are expected to have strong defenses more likely results in failure and waste, than attacking groups expected to be weak and defenseless (De Dreu et al., 2016b; Grossman and Kim, 2002; Goeree et al., 2003).”
From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Goeree et al., 2003
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., & Palfrey, T. R.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- University of Virginia (US)
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 97-113
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2145115072
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 20.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- risk aversion, mixed strategy equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, structural econometric model, 2×2 games, experimental game theory
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