The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The incentive for working hard: explaining hours worked differences in the US and Germany
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In the citing paper
“However, compounding the difficulty for researchers arising from the comparative scarcity of data on effort, much of the return to current effort will be in the form of future pay rises, and promotions, or beneficial job transitions.”
From Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense? (2004) · cites this paper as Bell and Freeman (2001)
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Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Hart, 1983, The size mobility of earnings, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 45, 181, 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1983.mp45002003.x · DOI
- Landers, 1996, Rat race redux: adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms, American Economic Review, 86, 3229
- Lazear, 1981, Rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841, 10.1086/261010 · DOI · Paper page
- Moulton, 1986, Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates, Journal of Econometrics, 32, 385, 10.1016/0304-4076(86)90021-7 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?
Green, F. (2004) · Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society · doi:10.1111/j.0019-8676.2004.00359.x · Cited by 408
Metadata
- Authors
- Bell, L. A., & Freeman, R. B.
- Venue
- Labour Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-202
- ISSN
- 0927-5371
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
