Cited by 332Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorAnimal Behavior and Reproduction

“It's a Wonderful Life”

Gurven, Michael, Allen-Arave, Wesley, Hill, Kim, Hurtado, Magdalena·2000·Evolution and Human Behavior

Abstract

Intensive food sharing among foragers and horticulturists is commonly explained as a means of reducing the risk of daily shortfalls, ensuring adequate daily consumption for all group members who actively pool resources. Consistently high food producers who give more than they receive, however, gain the least risk-reduction benefit from this daily pooling because they are the least likely to go without food on any given day. Why then do some high producers consistently share food, and why do some average producers share proportionally more food than others? We propose that although these individuals may not receive the same amounts they give (i.e., strict Tit-for-Tat), one explanation for their generosity is that they receive additional food during hard times. These include brief episodes of sickness, disease, injury, or accidents-fairly common events in traditional societies that can render individuals incapable of producing food, thereby having long-term effects on morbidity and fecundity and ultimately on lifetime reproductive success. Data collected among the Ache, a group of South American forager-horticulturists, indicate that those who shared and produced more than average (signaling cooperative intent and/or ability to produce) were rewarded with more food from more people when injured or sick than those who shared and produced below average. These results, framed within the context of tradeoffs between short-term and long-term fitness, may provide insight into motivations behind costly expenditures for establishing and reinforcing status and reputation.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00032-5

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References 36 · Cited by 332

Authors
Gurven, M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K., & Hurtado, M.
Affiliations
University of New Mexico (US)
Corresponding author
Gurven, Michael
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2000-07
Volume
21
Issue
4
Pages
263-282
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W85988172
Cited by
332
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 15
FWCI
32.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Leakey Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
Keywords
food sharing, Ache, reciprocity, tit-for-tat, risk mitigation, food production, reproductive success, costly signaling, cooperative behavior

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