Ransomware: to pay or not to pay?
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Woeful tales of seemingly endless ransomware attacks have been hitting the headlines for months now. One of the most notorious happened very recently – in February this year, in fact – when the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in the US was crippled by crypto-ransomware. The malware encrypted the files of the Medical organisation's electronic medical records system, among others, and ended up denying staff access to patient data. The number of ransomware attacks is increasing rapidly. And so are the ways in which this attack vector is being used. Moreover, while the business model of the criminal gangs involved traditionally focused on volume and on hitting as many consumers as possible in blanket attacks, it is now becoming more targeted and moving into the more lucrative business market. So the big question for organisations is, does it make more sense to pay or not to pay? Cath Everett investigates.
Overview
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In the citing paper
“Getting back the files after the victim's payment is not guaranteed [30,31].”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [30]
Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- 2016, ‘Radware's 2015/2016 Global Application and Network Security Report Predicts 2016 Will Bring The Battle of The Bots’, Radware
- Sjouwerman, 2015, ‘FBI Alert: Latest CryptoWall Ransomware Damage More Than $18 Million’, KnowBe4 blog
- 2016, ‘The Secret Behind CryptoWall's Success’, Imperva
- Newton, 2014, ‘CryptoLocker victims pay out’, University of Kent
Cited by
Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey
Salahdine, F., & Kaabouch, N. (2019) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi11040089 · Cited by 509
“Getting back the files after the victim’s payment is not guaranteed [30,31].”
BackgroundRansomware threat success factors, taxonomy, and countermeasures: A survey and research directions
Al-rimy, B. A. S., Maarof, M. A., & Shaid, S. Z. M. (2018) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2018.01.001 · Cited by 383
Know Abnormal, Find Evil: Frequent Pattern Mining for Ransomware Threat Hunting and Intelligence
Homayoun, S., Dehghantanha, A., Ahmadzadeh, M., Hashemi, S., & Khayami, R. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing · doi:10.1109/tetc.2017.2756908 · Cited by 146
“ques [29], ransomware programs are becoming a major tool”
BackgroundInternet of things and ransomware: Evolution, mitigation and prevention
Humayun, M., Jhanjhi, N., Alsayat, A., & Ponnusamy, V. (2021) · Egyptian Informatics Journal · doi:10.1016/j.eij.2020.05.003 · Cited by 209
“Below we provide some discussion about whether to pay or not to pay the ransom or what should be done to avoid ransom in the light of existing literature [83,84,87–89] The above discussion shows that the ransom amount should not be paid to discourage hackers.”
BackgroundDetecting Ransomware with Honeypot Techniques
Moore, C. (2016) · 2016 Cybersecurity and Cyberforensics Conference (CCC) · doi:10.1109/ccc.2016.14 · Cited by 154
“This is a lucrative business for the cybercriminals, one calculation [4] suggests the figure of 200 million USD per year is extorted by the criminal gangs.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Everett, C.
- Corresponding author
- Everett, Cath
- Venue
- Computer Fraud & Security
- Published
- 2016-04
- Volume
- 2016
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 8-12
- ISSN
- 1361-3723 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2339514484
- Cited by
- 84
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 13.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Computer Fraud & Security (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Keywords
- ransomware, crypto-ransomware, data encryption, electronic health records, cybercrime
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Ransomware: to pay or not to pay? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s1361-3723(16)30036-7
- The paper
- Everett, C. (2016). Ransomware: to pay or not to pay? Computer Fraud & Security. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1361-3723(16)30036-7
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.