Cited by 24Historical Economic and Social StudiesEconomic Theory and InstitutionsHistorical Economic and Legal Thought

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The Economics of Apprenticeship

Mokyr, Joel·2019·Apprenticeship in Early Modern Europe

Abstract

To understand the economic nature and impact of apprenticeship, we have to be alert to its features as an economic institution. Skills are often tacit or ‘implicit’ knowledge. Moreover, the apprenticeship contract is an unequal and non-repeated exchange between two parties, where the master teaches in the expectation that the apprentice will repay him through his work. The informational asymmetry led to contractual issues that required institutions that each had their own agendas and challenges. Guilds might want to limit entry, but their members also needed skilled workers; private contracts might be difficult and expensive to enforce and for outsiders to observe. Still, these institutions together allowed large numbers of youngsters to be apprenticed outside their family circle, with potentially large human capital effects. After 1500, the institutional forms of apprenticeship contracts in Europe were decisive in determining the rate at which innovations could spread across the larger environment and across communities.

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  • A full explanation of Britain's advantage would include above all the well-functioning market for apprenticeship training in Britain, which was widely regarded as more effective than elsewhere.

    “A full explanation of the sources of this advantage would include above all the well-functioning market for apprenticeship training in Britain, which was widely regarded as more effective than elsewhere (Mokyr, 2019;Ogilvie, 2019).”

    From The Mechanics of the Industrial Revolution (2023) · cites this paper as Mokyr, 2019

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Metadata

Authors
Mokyr, J.
Corresponding author
Mokyr, Joel
Venue
Apprenticeship in Early Modern Europe
Published
2019-11-30
Pages
20-43
OpenAlex
W2980948683
Cited by
24
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
FWCI
10.93
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Legal Thought
Keywords
apprenticeship, tacit knowledge, apprenticeship contracts, information asymmetry, guilds, human capital, diffusion of innovations, contract enforcement, economic institutions

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