The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Apprenticeship
Abstract
To understand the economic nature and impact of apprenticeship, we have to be alert to its features as an economic institution. Skills are often tacit or ‘implicit’ knowledge. Moreover, the apprenticeship contract is an unequal and non-repeated exchange between two parties, where the master teaches in the expectation that the apprentice will repay him through his work. The informational asymmetry led to contractual issues that required institutions that each had their own agendas and challenges. Guilds might want to limit entry, but their members also needed skilled workers; private contracts might be difficult and expensive to enforce and for outsiders to observe. Still, these institutions together allowed large numbers of youngsters to be apprenticed outside their family circle, with potentially large human capital effects. After 1500, the institutional forms of apprenticeship contracts in Europe were decisive in determining the rate at which innovations could spread across the larger environment and across communities.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
A full explanation of Britain's advantage would include above all the well-functioning market for apprenticeship training in Britain, which was widely regarded as more effective than elsewhere.
“A full explanation of the sources of this advantage would include above all the well-functioning market for apprenticeship training in Britain, which was widely regarded as more effective than elsewhere (Mokyr, 2019;Ogilvie, 2019).”
From The Mechanics of the Industrial Revolution (2023) · cites this paper as Mokyr, 2019
Citations
Cites
Flexible Supply of Apprenticeship in the British Industrial Revolution
Zeev, N. B., Mokyr, J., & van der Beek, K. (2017) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050717000043 · Cited by 48
Self-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 73
- Humphries, 2003, The Economic Future in Historical Perspective, 73
- 10.1017/S0022050711001586 · DOI
- 10.1111/ehr.12422 · DOI
- 10.2307/3678366 · DOI
- De Munck, 2007, Technologies of Learning: Apprenticeship in Antwerp Guilds from the 15th Century to the End of the Ancien Régime, 10.1484/M.SEUH-EB.5.106330 · DOI
- Reith, 2007, Learning on the Shop Floor: Historical Perspectives on Apprenticeship, 182
- Macgowan, 1888, Chinese guilds or chambers of commerce and trades unions, Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 21, 181
- Say, 1821, A Treatise on Political Economy, 1, 32
- Chaptal, 1819, De l’Industrie française, 2, 430
- Mokyr, 2002, The Gifts of Athena
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226556666.001.0001 · DOI
- 10.1006/exeh.2000.0765 · DOI
- 10.1017/CBO9780511780455 · DOI
- 10.1017/CBO9780511496738 · DOI
- 10.1017/S0022050700041632 · DOI
- Cannan, 1976, The Wealth of Nations, 137
- Davies, 1956, The Enforcement of English Apprenticeship: A Study in Applied Mercantilism, 1563–1642
- 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041042 · DOI · Paper page
- Lane, 1996, Apprenticeship in England 1600–1914
- 10.1093/qje/qjw026 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1086/666731 · DOI
- Cooter, 1982, ‘Bargaining in the shadow of the law: A testable model of strategic behavior’, Journal of Legal Studies, 11
- 10.2307/j.ctvcm4h7m · DOI
- Acemoglu, 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
- Darnton, 1984, The Great Cat Massacre and other Episodes in French Cultural History, 75
- 10.1023/A:1007803520748 · DOI
- Belfanti, 2004, ‘Guilds, patents, and the circulation of technical knowledge’, Technology and Culture, 45
- Mokyr, 2013, Human capital, useful knowledge, and long-term economic growth, Economia Politica, 30
- 10.1080/03071020903491724 · DOI
- 10.1017/CBO9781316335888 · DOI
- Epstein, 1995, Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe
- 10.1006/exeh.1996.0027 · DOI
- De Munck, 2010, ‘Corpses, live models, and nature: Assessing skills and knowledge before the Industrial Revolution (case: Antwerp)’, Technology and Culture, 51, 10.1353/tech.0.0454 · DOI
- Espinas, 1906, Recueil de Documents Relatifs à l’Histoire de l’lndustrie Drapière en Flandre, 1, 121
- 10.1017/CBO9780511750601 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.jce.2016.12.003 · DOI
- Polanyi, 1962, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, 49
- Farr, 2000, Artisans in Europe, 1300–1914, 34
- 10.1017/CBO9780511818196 · DOI
- Mitch, 1999, The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective
- Goody, 2001, Apprenticeship: From Theory to Method and Back Again, 289
- Dunlop, 1912, English Apprenticeship and Child Labor
- 10.1177/036319909201700402 · DOI
- Wallis, 2008, ‘Apprenticeship and training in premodern England’, Journal of Economic History, 68, 10.1017/S002205070800065X · DOI
- 10.1017/S002205070000797X · DOI
- Hamilton, 2000, The decline of apprenticeship in North America: Evidence from Montreal, Journal of Economic History, 60
- Smits, 2001, The Economics of the Apprenticeship System, 10.4337/9781035304073 · DOI
- 10.1093/qje/qjx026 · DOI
- 10.7551/mitpress/2613.001.0001 · DOI
- 10.1177/007327530704500201 · DOI
- 10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00009-7 · DOI
- 10.1163/9789004251571 · DOI
- McCloskey, 2016, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World, 10.7208/chicago/9780226334042.001.0001 · DOI
- 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00119-X · DOI
- 10.1257/000282806777212602 · DOI
- Kaplan, The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question, 199
- Davies, 2004, The History of the Merchant Taylors Company, 109
- 10.1353/jsh/25.1.89 · DOI
- Acemoglu, 2012, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
- Ogilvie, 2019, The European Guilds: An Economic Analysis
- Steffens, 2001, ‘Le métier volé: Transmission des savoir-faire et socialization dans les métiers qualifiés au XIXe siècle’, Revue du Nord, 15, 131
- Posner, 2000, Law and Social Norms
- van Zanden, 2009, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000–1800, 165, 10.1163/ej.9789004175174.i-346 · DOI
- 10.9783/9781512807189 · DOI
- Harris, 1992, Essays in Industry and Technology in the Eighteenth Century, 33
- 10.7312/burg93558 · DOI
- Wootton, 2015, The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution, 476
- Morse, 1909, The Gilds of China: With an Account of the Gild Merchant or Co-hong of Canton, 33
- 10.1017/9781787442382 · DOI
- Elbaum, 1995, The economic rationale of apprenticeship training: Some lessons from British and US experience, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 34, 593, 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1995.tb00390.x · DOI
- Davids, 2008, The Rise and Decline of Dutch Technological Leadership, 2, 385, 10.1163/ej.9789004168657.i-634 · DOI
- 10.2307/j.ctt1wf4dft · DOI
- Davids, 2012, Religion, Technology and the Great and Little Divergences, 60
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Mechanics of the Industrial Revolution
Kelly, M., Mokyr, J., & Ó Gráda, C. (2023) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/720890 · Cited by 70
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Mokyr, J.
- Corresponding author
- Mokyr, Joel
- Venue
- Apprenticeship in Early Modern Europe
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2019-11-30
- Pages
- 20-43
- OpenAlex
- W2980948683
- Cited by
- 24
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 10.93
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Legal Thought
- Keywords
- apprenticeship, tacit knowledge, apprenticeship contracts, information asymmetry, guilds, human capital, diffusion of innovations, contract enforcement, economic institutions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review