The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government
Abstract
Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“considering that a professional bureaucracy is oftentimes found positively associated both with the successful implementation of policy programs and with various social and economic outcomes (e.g. Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Nistotskaya 2020).”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Dahlström and Lapuente 2017
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–176 of 176
Gomide, A. D. Á., Machado, R. A., & Lins, R. D. S. (2022) · Organizações & Sociedade · doi:10.1590/1984-92302022v29n0009pt · Cited by 4
“Os determinantes do desempenho governamental têm sido debatidos na última década pela literatura a partir principalmente da perspectiva da burocracia do Poder Executivo (Centeno et al. 2017; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Fukuyama, 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialCorruption victimization and anti‐incumbent voting
Bourassa, A., Weitz-Shapiro, R. B., & Winters, M. S. (2021) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12651 · Cited by 4
Salazar-Morales, D. (2021) · doi:10.1111/gove.12568 · Cited by 4
Public Administration Reform over Time – Did Change Lead to a More Effective Integrity Management?
Demmke, C. (2020) · Central European Public Administration Review · doi:10.17573/cepar.2020.2.01 · Cited by 4
“Dahlström and Lapuente (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017) examine the existing link between bureaucratic structures and corruption.”
BackgroundLa Administración Pública en la era del cambio exponencial. Hacia una gobernanza exploratoria
MARTÍNEZ, F. L. (2019) · Pertsonak eta Antolakunde Publikoak kudeatzeko Euskal Aldizkaria / Revista Vasca de Gestión de Personas y Organizaciones Públicas · doi:10.47623/ivap-rvgp.16.2019.ab.03 · Cited by 4
What explains trust in institutions? Multi-disciplinary evidence from an international survey
Murtin, F., Pipke, D., Grimalda, G. F., Bonnet, J., Fleischer, L., Gonzalez, S., Siegerink, V., Aassve, A., Algan, Y., Cêtre, S., et al. (2026) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1017/s1475676526100875 · Cited by 6
Yusoff, N. B., & Zulkipli, I. (2025) · Asian Review of Public Administration · doi:10.64423/arpa.v33i1.69 · Cited by 3
“…coach, and impose standards to enhance rule consistency and reduce the risk of discretion-driven integrity, which can also be seen in comparative data on the relationship between professional management and cleaner, more competent bureaucracies (Menzel, 2017; Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2017).”
On mechanisms of meritocratic recruitment: competence and impartiality
Kolvani, P., & Nistotskaya, M. (2025) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137425000086 · Cited by 4
“…over making and breaking bureaucratic careers through practices such as merit-based recruitment, protection from politically motivated dismissals, deferred compensation, and other measures (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017; Miller, 2000; Nistotskaya and Cingolani, 2016; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008).”
InfluentialBureaucracy and policymaking: Evidence from a choice-based conjoint analysis
Batista, M. (2023) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/20531680231180980 · Cited by 3
“Meri-tocracy allegedly generates competence, absence of par-ticularism, long-term orientation, and motivation for public service (Horn, 1995; Nistotskaya and Cingolani, 2017; Colonnelli et al., 2020; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2017; Perry and Wise, 1990).”
BackgroundKim, H. (2023) · International Review of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/12294659.2023.2188626 · Cited by 3
“Furthermore, those recruited by political ties may waste resources in achieving political goals for a particular party or partisan group (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Lyrintzis, 2011).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPower-sharing in governments, clarity of responsibility, and the control of corruption
Jang, J. (2021) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2021.1963996 · Cited by 3
“The WGI dataset is widely accepted as providing useful indicators of the quality of government (Charron & Lapuente, 2010, 2011; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Dahlström et al., 2012).”
MethodMacCarthy, J., & Adoboe-Mensah, N. (2023) · Corporate governance: An interdisciplinary outlook · doi:10.22495/cgaiop20 · Cited by 3
“Bad management due to bad corporate governance has led to corruption, inefficiencies, and ineffectiveness in the public sector and, in some cases, outright intuitional failures (Collier, 2008; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Moore, 2001).”
BackgroundMaking a Career in Dictatorship
Gläßel, C., & Scharpf, A. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197831229.001.0001 · Cited by 1
Reflections on Comparative Teaching in Public Administration
Moloney, K., Suzuki, K., Demircioglu, M., Stanica, C. M., Yerramsetti, S., Manoharan, A., & Perry, J. L. (2025) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.70032 · Cited by 2
Demmke, C. (2025) · Central European Public Administration Review · doi:10.17573/cepar.2025.1.03 · Cited by 2
Bureaucratic Packing in the Brazilian Amazon: How Political Competition Drives Deforestation
Xu, A. Z. (2024) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/734242 · Cited by 4
Obeta, R. U., & Edwin, E. (2024) · Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review · doi:10.65453/ajbmr.v13i1.1252 · Cited by 2
Morales, D. A. S., Pineda, P., & Lauriano, L. A. (2024) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12860 · Cited by 3
Batista, M. (2023) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12649 · Cited by 2
Impartial Administration and Peaceful Agrarian Reform: The Foundations for Democracy in Scandinavia
Andersen, D. D. E. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055423000205 · Cited by 10
“Meritocracy is the principal driver of general impartiality (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017), but mer-itocratically recruited yet recalcitrant agents at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy constitute a separate problem for the impartial implementation of policies (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond…”
BackgroundSchool library and students’ understanding of public administration
Awaah, F., Okebukola, P., Shabani, J., Yeboah, S., Gbeleyi, O., & Emmanuella, H. S. (2022) · Teaching Public Administration · doi:10.1177/01447394221103956 · Cited by 2
“…and Wang, 2017), poor monitoring and accountability systems (Botero et al., 2013), lack of adequate resources (Kleinknecht et al., 2016), and an unproductive relationship structure between bureaucrats and politicians (Dahlstr¨om and Lapuente, 2017; Hymowitz, 2016; Nistotskaya and Cingolani, 2016).”
BackgroundGomide, A. D. Á., Machado, R., & Lins, R. D. S. (2022) · Organizações & Sociedade · doi:10.1590/1984-92302022v29n0009en · Cited by 2
“This result is in line with the arguments of Evans and Rauch (1999) and Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) that the meritocratic selection of bureaucrats can avoid their "political" capture, rent-seeking, and corruption.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialIT WAS PERSONAL: POLITICS AND MILITARY PROMOTIONS IN THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC (1931–1936)
Parra-Perez, A. L. (2019) · Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0212610919000247 · Cited by 2
“Meritocratic, non-politicised bureaucracies with separate careers for politicians and bureaucrats have been found to lead to lower levels of corruption and more effective governments (Dahlström et al. 2012; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundIntroduction: Bureaucracy in Transition
Byrkjeflot, H., & Engelstad, F. (2018) · Comparative Social Research · doi:10.1108/s0195-631020180000033005 · Cited by 2
Ibáñez, D., & Bello-Gómez, R. A. (2026) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.70185
Ripoll, G. (2026) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/00208523261433882 · Cited by 1
“…the spoils system collapsed and Wilson (1887) proposed a professional, non-partisan, public administration, most countries allow politicians to select new bureaucrats or launch new governance programmes well suited to a speci fi c pro fi le of current civil servants (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017).”
Pimentel, R. G. R., & Ferreira, V. D. R. S. (2026) · Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania · doi:10.12660/cgpc.v31.n4.92445 · Cited by 1
Driving employee engagement across sectors: current evidence and an agenda for future research
Hameduddin, T., Alfes, K., & Ritz, A. (2026) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2026.2649360 · Cited by 1
Projecting power at home and abroad: domestic state capacity and military capability
Lindvall, J., Lundgren, M., & Teorell, J. (2026) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1093/jopres/xjaf018 · Cited by 1
Wong, W. (2026) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.70059 · Cited by 1
Bauhr, M., & Charron, N. (2025) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.70101 · Cited by 1
Unwritten Rules of the Game in the Danish and Dutch Core Executives
Trangbæk, A., van Dorp, E., Salomonsen, H., & Hart, P. '. (2025) · Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions · doi:10.1111/gove.70082 · Cited by 1
Garrido-Vergara, L., & Cienfuegos, I. (2025) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.70001 · Cited by 1
“…(Suzuki and Demircioglu 2018), civic actions (Cornell and Grimes 2015), political legitimacy, satisfaction with government, and support for democracy (Bor-äng et al. 2017; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Rothstein 2009), and administrative effectiveness (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Cienfuegos 2016).”
An alternative form of bureaucracy; the operational framework of the city’s governing authority
Hassani, M., Atani, A. R., Hamidizadeh, M., & Abdolhamid, M. (2024) · Journal of Infrastructure Policy and Development · doi:10.24294/jipd.v8i5.4278 · Cited by 1
“Whether having a Weberian bureaucratic organization promotes “good outcomes,” including good governance, are ultimately empirical questions (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundCooper, C. A., & Boucher, M. (2024) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2023.1291890 · Cited by 1
Explaining the role of expertise in the state: the case of Italy
Christensen, J., & Forato, S. (2022) · Political Research Exchange · doi:10.1080/2474736x.2022.2119874 · Cited by 3
“Moreover, recruitment to the bureaucracy based on merit rather than connections is key for government performance, such as limiting corruption and inefficiency and improving the quality of policies (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundNacional-liberalismo: la legitimación del franquismo entre capitalismo tardío y guerra fría
Sales, J. (2021) · Araucaria · doi:10.12795/araucaria.2021.i47.11 · Cited by 1
The Politicization of the Bureaucracy in Local Government (Case Study in Indonesia)
Aminah, S., Hs, T., & Maemunah, S. (2021) · doi:10.4108/eai.6-3-2021.2306284 · Cited by 1
“Regarding corruption, a study by Dahlström & Lapuente (2017) found that implementing a merit system has reduced the level of corruption.”
BackgroundMethodCorruption and public administration
Graycar, A. (2020) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781789900910.00006 · Cited by 9
Trondal, J., & Kühn, N. S. (2019) · World Political Science · doi:10.1515/wps-2019-0001 · Cited by 1
Disbursement procedure challenges of a public medical institution in the Philippines
Denoso, R. A., Briones, R., Espinosa, M., & Briones, J. P. (2023) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4644665 · Cited by 1
Cooper, C. A. (2019) · British Politics · doi:10.1057/s41293-019-00113-8
Отраслевая структура бюрократии и экономический рост
Borshchevskii, G. (2026) · HSE Economic Journal · doi:10.17323/ej.2026.43546
Bureaucracy and Growth: The Case of Russia
Borshchevskiy, G. (2026) · Economic Policy · doi:10.18288/1994-5124-2026-5-174-201
Ekekwe, E., Onyejegbu, D., Ibeh, J., Okafor, C. O., Okoye, K., & Idoko, C. O. (2026) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440261491019
Rebuilding GeoHealth: Science, Governance, and Resilience After 2025
Bratburd, J., Kerr, G., Askins, K., Buchanan, P. R., Magers, B. M., Yeager, R., & Calder, R. S. D. (2026) · GeoHealth · doi:10.1029/2026gh001997
Merit, autonomy, and corruption: the moderating role of anti-corruption institutions in Africa
Fernández, S., & Cheema, F. S. (2026) · International Public Management Journal · doi:10.1080/10967494.2026.2718927
Inhibitory Institutions: The Tradeoffs of Public Goods Quantity and Quality
Holland, A. C. (2026) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140261487977
The impact of the bureaucratic environment on public service digitalization
Morales, D. S., Villodre, J., & Klievink, B. (2026) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/00208523261479945
Machacuay, C., Lincovil, J., & Rojas, H. (2026) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.18354
“Comparative state-capacity research shows that development outcomes depend not only on elected leaders but also on the autonomy, merit orientation, and continuity of the administrative apparatus (Cingolani, 2013; Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017; Grindle, 2012).”
Borges, A., & Mauerberg, A. (2026) · Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions · doi:10.1111/gove.70148
Legislative Pork‐Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local‐Level Factors
Viana, L., & Peci, A. (2026) · Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions · doi:10.1111/gove.70145
Gyllenhammar, D., Eriksson, H., & Alexandersson, P. (2026) · International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management · doi:10.1108/ijqrm-05-2025-0192
“Research on PA and improvement suggests a dual role: the bureaucratic structure provides stability, procedural legitimacy and professional autonomy that can support systematic improvement work (Dahlstr € om and Lapuente, 2017; Eriksson et al. , 2025).”
Margareta, Z., Nadir, Sakur, M., & Arrohim, N. A. (2026) · Indonesia Journal of Business Law · doi:10.47709/ijbl.v5i2.9058
Balancing Neutral and Responsive Competences in the Context of Functional Politicization
Opstrup, N., Salomonsen, H. H., Grøn, C. H., & Villadsen, A. R. (2026) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70072 · Cited by 1
Arfan, A., & Wardani, S. (2026) · Jurnal Locus Penelitian dan Pengabdian · doi:10.58344/locus.v5i5.5815
Patronage, territory and the appointment of top civil servants
Mamshae, A. (2026) · Territory, Politics, Governance · doi:10.1080/21622671.2026.2660788
Jugl, M. (2026) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.70078
The Application Paradox: How National Officials Perceive Their Role When Applying EU Law
Saes-Louarn, A. N., & Zelano, K. H. (2026) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-9477.70040
Bach, T., & Squevin, P. (2026) · International Public Management Journal · doi:10.1080/10967494.2026.2631042
Borshchevskiy, G. (2026) · Voprosy Ekonomiki · doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2026-3-5-24
Estado e democracia: a construção inacabada da burocracia profissional na América Latina
Machado, R. A., & Gomide, A. D. Á. (2026) · Revista del CLAD. Reforma y Democracia · doi:10.69733/clad.ryd.n94.a442
The Calculus of Corrupt Decision-Making: An Integrated Analytical Framework
Vieira, J. B. (2025) · Reflexión Política · doi:10.29375/01240781.5503
Tiwary, M. K., & Amit (2025) · European Journal of Research in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1177/00195561251394495
“Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) caution that ‘cohesive factions’ in bureaucratic settings can weaken accountability, as closely connected elites may prioritize shared interests over impartial responsibility.”
When Nature Strikes: Which Regimes Exploit Natural Disasters for Fiscal Expansion?
Jensen, M. D., & Wang, S. (2025) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.70060
Barrios-Suvelza, F. X. (2025) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-024-00587-2
Was ist der Gegenstand der Fiskalsoziologie? Ein Plädoyer für die Kategorie des Steuerstaats
Döpking, L. (2024) · Berliner Journal für Soziologie · doi:10.1007/s11609-024-00530-7
Hinweise für Autorinnen und Autoren
Budrich, B. (2023) · Sozialpsychiatrische Informationen · doi:10.5771/0171-4538-2023-2-53
Comportements de travail innovateurs et réseautage à l’échelle de l’administration
Demircioğlu, M. A., Hameduddin, T., & Knox, C. (2023) · Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives · doi:10.3917/risa.891.0097
El Leviatán contra la COVID-19
Lapuente, V. (2022) · Reforma y democracia. · doi:10.69733/clad.ryd.n82.a257 · Cited by 1
Self-citationCho, B., & Rethemeyer, R. K. (2020) · Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research · doi:10.1145/3396956.3396961 · Cited by 1
“Peers will evaluate their behaviors based on how they fulfilled the goals of organizations and committed to the interest of the general public rather than specific constituencies [12, 15, 37].”
BackgroundYlisalo, J. (2019) · European Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s1755773919000195
Kirby, N., & Webbe, S. (2019) · Research Insights · doi:10.54810/erqp2900
Johanson, J. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03439-9_2 · Cited by 3
Internationaler Governance-Vergleich
Fromm, N., & Veit, S. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-24280-0_13
Metadata
- Authors
- Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V.
- Affiliations
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- ORCID
- Dahlström, Carl
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2017-06-15
- OpenAlex
- W4248557076
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 13.81
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- meritocracy, political connections, corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic modernization, civil service recruitment, good governance, comparative bureaucracy, Spain, Sweden
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review