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Between coercion and contract: competing narratives on taxation and governance
Abstract
Introduction This chapter is motivated by some important facts, some stimulating theory and an urgent policy concern. The facts are that, relative to the historical experience of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the governments of many contemporary developing countries are more independent of their domestic taxpayers for revenue. On average – and with wide variations – they depend a great deal on alternative sources of income that were not available to governments when the OECD countries were comparably poor: rents from natural resource wealth and strategic rents (in practice, mainly foreign aid). The theory suggests that there is a causal connection from (a) this dependence on rents , rather than taxes, to (b) the fact that public authority in much of the South is often relatively illegitimate, ineffective and unaccountable (‘bad government’). More simply, the proposition is that the dependence of governments on broad taxation for revenue is good for the quality of governance. If the theory were right, then we should like to change the ways in which many Southern governments are financed. The volumes of development aid, the modalities of the aid relationship and the control of rents from natural resource wealth all become important concerns from a ‘good government’ perspective.
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A substantial governance 'dividend' can be gained from mobilizing domestic financial resources through the tax system.
“There is a strong argument in the literature that a substantial governance 'dividend' can be gained from mobilizing domestic financial resources through the tax system.”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Moore 2008
The tax system may contribute to improved governance through fiscal bargaining by engaging citizens in the political process, as taxpayers have a legitimate right to expect something in return for taxes paid and are more likely to hold their government to account if it underperforms.
“(iii) Fiscal bargaining by engaging citizens in the political process. Taxpayers have a legitimate right to expect something in return for taxes paid, and are more likely to hold their government to account if it underperforms.”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Moore 2008
The tax system may contribute to improved governance through state capacity processes, which require states to develop a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection because of their dependence on taxes, and this is expected to lead to broader improvements in public administration.
“(ii) State capacity processes which require states to develop a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection because of their dependence on taxes. This is also expected to lead to broader improvements in public administration.”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Moore 2008
The tax system may contribute to improved governance through common interest processes, which ensure that governments have stronger incentives to promote economic growth because they depend on taxes and therefore on the prosperity of taxpayers.
“(i) Common interest processes which ensure that governments have stronger incentives to promote economic growth since they are dependent on taxes and therefore on the prosperity of taxpayers.”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Moore 2008
For taxation to have a positive effect on accountability, taxes must be 'felt' by a majority of citizens, so that tax issues become prominent on the public political agenda.
“Third, for taxation to have a positive effect on accountability taxes must be 'felt' by a majority of citizens, to secure that tax issues become prominent on the public political agenda (Moore 2008).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Moore 2008
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Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries
Fjeldstad, O. (2014) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.1676 · Cited by 96
“The political arguments for inclusion have not been heard (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Sussex (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Moore, Mick
- Venue
- Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2008-01-10
- Pages
- 34-63
- OpenAlex
- W154553429
- Cited by
- 155
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 23.46
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Keywords
- taxation, natural resource rents, foreign aid, bad governance, public finance, developing countries, governance quality, political legitimacy, OECD comparison
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