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Perfect Deterrence
Abstract
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
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Citations
Cited by
Lemke, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491511 · Cited by 347
The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda
Lupovici, A. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x · Cited by 126
The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace
Taddeo, M. (2018) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-017-0290-2 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-21
- OpenAlex
- W4299920209
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 24.68
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511491788
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