The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Sight and touch
Abstract
We can tell what the shape or size of an object is by either sight or touch. These two senses are very different in character, not only in the mechanisms of perception – the physical media, the physiological organs of sense and possibly the psychological processing involved – but also in their phenomenological character, what it is like to see and to feel. This can lead one to ask how it is that the same properties can be perceived by the two senses, and the issues that surround this question have been discussed by both philosophers and psychologists over the centuries. But a converse question also arises, namely, given that the same properties are perceived, where does the difference between the senses lie? Is this phenomenological difference really a difference in spatial perception between the senses? That is the topic of this paper. The commonest treatment of these issues fails to offer any satisfactory answer. It suggests that we can look for one in two places: in the different properties of things in the world that are perceptible by each of the senses; or in the different subjective qualities of perceptual experiences. Since we are concerned with the differences between senses with respect to perceiving the same properties, the former approach is not applicable. But the latter approach fails to offer any illuminating answer to the question. For it simply posits some introspectible difference between the senses without saying any more about it.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Gallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Why Is There So Much More Research on Vision Than on Any Other Sensory Modality?
Hutmacher, F. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02246 · Cited by 368
Serino, A., & Haggard, P. (2010) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.04.004 · Cited by 212
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, M.
- Venue
- The Contents of Experience
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1992-03-12
- Pages
- 196-215
- OpenAlex
- W1584508586
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sight and touch. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511554582.010
- The paper
- Martin, M. (1992). Sight and touch. The Contents of Experience. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511554582.010
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.