Theories and modules: creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Modules and theories I and others have made a case for the similarities between scientific knowledge and children's knowledge, and between scientific change and cognitive development (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992, 1994; Gopnik, 1988; Carey, 1986, 1988; Keil, 1989; Wellman, 1990). In the rest of this chapter I will call this general view of cognitive development the ‘theory-formation theory’. However, it is important to say that not all knowledge is like science, and not all development is like scientific change. The analogy to science would be of little interest if it were. My claim is that there are quite distinctive and special cognitive processes that are responsible both for scientific progress and for particular kinds of development in children. Other kinds of cognition and cognitive development may be quite different. It is my further claim that theories and theory changes, in particular, are responsible for the changes in children's understanding of the mind. But this is an empirical claim and it only gains explanatory force if we can contrast it with other possible explanations. In previous work, I have outlined the distinctive features of a theory-formation account in some detail, and have contrasted it with the predictions of a simulation theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). In this paper, I will focus instead on the contrast between this account and modularity accounts. These provide one contrast case to the theory-formation view.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Attachment and reflective function: Their role in self-organization
FONAGY, P., & TARGET, M. (1997) · Development and Psychopathology · doi:10.1017/s0954579497001399 · Cited by 1,708
Modularity, Development and ‘Theory of Mind’
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (1999) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00106 · Cited by 537
Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002160 · Cited by 481
Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and The Development of the Theory of Mind
Garfield, J. L., Peterson, C. C., & Perry, T. (2001) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00180 · Cited by 266
Conversation and theory of mind: Do children talk their way to socio‐cognitive understanding?
de Rosnay, M., & Hughes, C. (2006) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1348/026151005x82901 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Gopnik, A.
- Venue
- Theories of Theories of Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1996-02-23
- Pages
- 169-183
- OpenAlex
- W2990581795
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.89
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Theories and modules: creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511597985.012
- The paper
- Gopnik, A. (1996). Theories and modules: creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat. Theories of Theories of Mind. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511597985.012
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.