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Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy
Abstract
This is the first book to provide a hard-headed economic view of the voluntary approaches to environmental issues, especially toxic chemicals, waste disposal and global warming, that have become prominent in recent years. Corporate environmental initiatives are seen as a tool for influencing the behaviour of environmental activists, legislators, and regulators, though they may have ancillary benefits such as attracting 'green' consumers or reducing costs. Equally, government voluntary programs are seen as a way to achieve modest environmental results when political resistance to mandatory policies is high. Rigorous analysis is illustrated with numerous case studies drawn from the US, Europe, and Japan, while technical details are relegated to appendices, and each chapter highlights implications for corporate strategy and public policy. Although rooted in economic theory, this book will appeal to business strategists and policy practitioners, as well as scholars and researchers.
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Citations
Cited by
Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit
Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. (2011) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00282.x · Cited by 1,569
Self-citationEconomic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility
Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.51 · Cited by 1,116
Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?
MALHOTRA, N., MONIN, B., & TOMZ, M. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000679 · Cited by 137
Metadata
- Authors
- Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2004-12-13
- OpenAlex
- W1777451552
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 23.15
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.