The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Morality and the theory of rational behaviour
Abstract
Historical background The ethical theory I am going to describe in this paper is based on three different time-honoured intellectual traditions in moral philosophy. It also makes essential use of a great intellectual accomplishment of much more recent origin, namely, the modern Bayesian theory of rational behaviour under risk and uncertainty. One of the three moral traditions I am indebted to goes back to Adam Smith, who equated the moral point of view with that of an impartial but sympathetic spectator (or observer). In any social situation, each participant will tend to look at the various issues from his own self-centred, often emotionally biassed, and possibly quite one-sided, partisan point of view. In contrast, if anybody wants to assess the situation from a moral point of view in terms of some standard of justice and equity, this will essentially amount to looking at it from the standpoint of an impartial but humane and sympathetic observer. It may be interesting to note that modern psychological studies on the development of moral ideas in children have come up with a very similar model of moral value judgements. Another intellectual tradition I have benefited from is Kant's. Kant claimed that moral rules can be distinguished from other behavioural rules by certain formal criteria and, in particular, by the criterion of universality (which may also be described as a criterion of reciprocity). For example, if I really believe that other people should repay me any money they have borrowed from me, then I must admit that I am under a similar moral obligation to repay any money I have borrowed from other persons under comparable circumstances.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Arvola, A., Vassallo, M., Dean, M., Lampila, P., Saba, A., Lähteenmäki, L., & Shepherd, R. (2008) · Appetite · doi:10.1016/j.appet.2007.09.010 · Cited by 930
Multiple Discrepancies Theory (MDT)
Michalos, A. C. (2005) · Social Indicators Research Series · doi:10.1007/1-4020-3742-2_13 · Cited by 593
How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?
Dolan, P., & White, M. P. (2007) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00030.x · Cited by 416
The Moral Demands of Affluence
Cullity, G. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199258112.001.0001 · Cited by 325
Salloch, S., Vollmann, J., & Schildmann, J. (2014) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101253 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- C, J., & Harsanyi
- Venue
- Utilitarianism and Beyond
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1982-06-10
- Pages
- 39-62
- OpenAlex
- W2989579399
- Cited by
- 318
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.26
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Morality and the theory of rational behaviour. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511611964.004
- The paper
- C, J., & Harsanyi. (1982). Morality and the theory of rational behaviour. Utilitarianism and Beyond. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511611964.004
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.