Human Identity and Bioethics
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Abstract
When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life.
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Citations
Cited by
Klaming, L., & Haselager, P. (2013) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-010-9093-1 · Cited by 166
Practical versus moral identities in identity management
Manders-Huits, N. (2010) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-010-9216-8 · Cited by 31
Authenticity and psychiatric disorder: does autonomy of personal preferences matter
Sjöstrand, M., & Juth, N. (2014) · Medicine Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-013-9509-x · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- DeGrazia, D.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2005-06-13
- OpenAlex
- W4211017747
- Cited by
- 479
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.09
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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