The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
PRESIDENTIAL CABINETS, ELECTORAL CYCLES, AND COALITION DISCIPLINE IN BRAZIL
Abstract
Introduction Recent works on Latin American presidentialism (Amorim Neto 1998; Deheza 1998; Thibaut 1998) indicate that the frequency of coalition governments in this area is higher than expected by comparative theorists of this system of government (Jones 1995; Lijphart 1992; Linz 1994). While such a finding reveals that Third World presidential democracies are able to devise extraconstitutional means by which the crisis proclivity of minority presidents can be overcome, it remains to be seen whether multiparty presidential cabinets can work as parliamentary-style coalitions that in general display a high degree of unity on the floor of parliament and operate in conjunction with the executive to promote legislation. Brazil is a good starting point to tackle this question. There is an ongoing debate in the comparative presidentialism literature about Brazil's prevalent pattern of government formation. On the one hand, Abranches (1988), Deheza (1997, pp. 192–230), and Meneguello (1998) contend that all Brazilian presidents appoint coalition governments. On the other, Amorim Neto (1994, 1995) and Thibaut (1996, pp. 282–321) caution against a loose application of the concept of coalition government to presidential systems and argue that other types of cabinets also have been formed in this country. While Abranches, Deheza, and Meneguello simply count the number of parties drafted into the cabinet to assert their coalitional status, Amorim Neto and Thibaut also look at cooptation strategies (as opposed to coalition ones) employed by presidents in their dealings with political parties and social actors, and the recruitment criteria of individual ministers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies
Jones, M. P. (1996) · doi:10.1353/book.147213 · Cited by 279
Cited by
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Carey, J. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810077 · Cited by 466
Women Ministers in Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why?
Escobar‐Lemmon, M., & Taylor‐Robinson, M. M. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00158.x · Cited by 371
Ethnicity and electoral politics
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-7072 · Cited by 364
The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime
Raile, E. D., Pereira, C., & Power, T. J. (2011) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912909355711 · Cited by 294
The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas
Neto, O. A. (2006) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414005282381 · Cited by 268
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Neto, O. A.
- Venue
- Legislative Politics in Latin America
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2002-03-04
- Pages
- 48-78
- OpenAlex
- W1484266810
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 86.28
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: PRESIDENTIAL CABINETS, ELECTORAL CYCLES, AND COALITION DISCIPLINE IN BRAZIL. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511615665.004
- The paper
- Neto, O. A. (2002). PRESIDENTIAL CABINETS, ELECTORAL CYCLES, AND COALITION DISCIPLINE IN BRAZIL. Legislative Politics in Latin America. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511615665.004
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.