The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The IMF and Economic Development
Abstract
Why do governments turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with what effects? This book argues that governments enter IMF programs for economic and political reasons, and finds that the effects are negative on economic growth and income distribution. By bringing in the IMF, governments gain political leverage - via conditionality - to push through unpopular policies. Note that if governments desiring conditions are more likely to participate, estimating program effects is not straightforward: one must control for the potentially unobserved political determinants of selection. This book addresses the selection problem using a dynamic bivariate version of the Heckman model analyzing cross-national time-series data. The main finding is that the negative effects of IMF programs on economic growth are mitigated for certain constituencies since programs also have distributional consequences. But IMF programs doubly hurt the least well off in society: they lower growth and shift the income distribution upward.
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Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital
Coleman, J. S. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228943 · Cited by 26,975
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994) · Princeton University Press · doi:10.1515/9781400821211 · Cited by 7,225
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400820740 · Cited by 7,106
Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth
Barro, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261726 · Cited by 6,340
(1976) · Annals of Economic and Social Measurement · Cited by 5,035
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Coleman, J. S. (1990) · Cited by 3,444
Cited by
The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.090106.142507 · Cited by 1,379
How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes
Wright, J. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00386.x · Cited by 372
Stuckler, D., & Basu, S. (2009) · International Journal of Health Services · doi:10.2190/hs.39.4.j · Cited by 104
Coalitions, Carrots, and Sticks: Economic Inequality and Authoritarian States
Gallagher, M., & Hanson, J. K. (2009) · PS: Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096509990096 · Cited by 75
Noy, S. (2018) · Oxford Development Studies · doi:10.1080/13600818.2017.1346068 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Vreeland, J. R.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-03-03
- OpenAlex
- W3141859414
- Cited by
- 609
- References
- 71
- FWCI
- 11.71
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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