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Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes
Abstract
SCIENCE: REASON OR RELIGION For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge – proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein's results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth – as some logical empiricists do – to the ideal of ‘probable truth’ or – as some sociologists of knowledge do – to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’. Popper's distinction lies primarily in his having grasped the full implications of the collapse of the best-corroborated scientific theory of all times: Newtonian mechanics and the Newtonian theory of gravitation. In his view virtue lies not in caution in avoiding errors, but in ruthlessness in eliminating them. Boldness in conjectures on the one hand and austerity in refutations on the other: this is Popper's recipe.
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Cited by
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Meehl, P. E. (1990) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0102_1 · Cited by 673
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars
Mayo, D. G. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781107286184 · Cited by 376
An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Improving Research Quality Before Data Collection
Aguinis, H., & Vandenberg, R. J. (2014) · Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091231 · Cited by 304
Antons, D., & Piller, F. T. (2015) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2013.0091 · Cited by 289
Metadata
- Venue
- The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1978-05-18
- Pages
- 8-101
- OpenAlex
- W1496810557
- Cited by
- 615
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 63.60
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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