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Privacy, intimacy, and personhood
Abstract
The Summer 1975 issue of Philosophy & Public Affairs featured three articles on privacy, one by Judith Jarvis Thomson, one by Thomas Scanlon in response to Thomson, and one by James Rachels in response to them both. Thomson starts from the observation that “the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is” (p. 295) and goes on to argue that nobody should have one—a very clear idea, that is. Her argument is essentially that all the various protections to which we feel the right to privacy entitles us are already included under other rights, such as “the cluster of rights which the right over the person consists in and also … the cluster of rights which owning property consists in” (p. 306). After a romp through some exquisitely fanciful examples, she poses and answers some questions about some of the kinds of “invasions” we would likely think of as violations of the right to privacy: Someone looks at your pornographic picture in your wall-safe? He violates your right that your belongings not be looked at, and you have that right because you have ownership rights—and it is because you have them that what he does is wrong. Someone uses an X-ray device to look at you through the walls of your house? […]
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Citations
Cited by
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty
Whitman, J. Q. (2004) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/4135723 · Cited by 601
Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies
boyd, D., & Marwick, A. (2017) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/2gec4 · Cited by 253
Privacy literacy instruction practices in academic libraries: Past, present, and possibilities
Hartman-Caverly, S., & Chisholm, A. (2020) · IFLA Journal · doi:10.1177/0340035220956804 · Cited by 27
“Integrity, both in a physical and metaphysical sense, is safeguarded by privacy, whereby one exerts a right to bodily integrity (Reiman, 1984; Warren and Brandeis, 1890) and engages the information norms that comprise Nissenbaum’s (2004: 124, 139–40) theory of “contextual integrity.””
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Reiman, J. H.
- Venue
- Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1984-11-30
- Pages
- 300-316
- OpenAlex
- W3170463527
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 22.15
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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