The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions
Abstract
This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.
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Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Status-quo and omission biases
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00208786 · Cited by 613
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Self-citationAnimal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior
Loewenstein, G. F., & O'Donoghue, T. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.539843 · Cited by 388
Partitioning default effects: Why people choose not to choose.
Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied · doi:10.1037/a0024354 · Cited by 340
Self-citationDefaults and Donation Decisions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H.
- Venue
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-25
- Pages
- 224-240
- OpenAlex
- W2057302005
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.08
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H. (2000). Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions. Choices, Values, and Frames. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803475.014
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.