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Cited by 115Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentPrimate Behavior and Ecology

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Self-awareness in animals

DeGrazia, David·2009·The Philosophy of Animal Minds
DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511819001.012
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Abstract

This chapter claims that the cumulative force of various empirical data and conceptual considerations makes it more reasonable to accept than to deny that many animals are self-aware. It considers studies focusing on animals' preferences. In the philosophy of mind, desires and beliefs are classified as propositional attitudes, mental states that take propositions or sentences as their objects. Desires to do certain things and intentional actions that involve doing them suggest at least some rudimentary awareness of oneself as persisting through time. Strengthening the case for intentional action, and therefore for bodily self-awareness, is evidence of more sophisticated behaviors in animals involving planning, complex problem-solving, and/or tool use. Like intentional action involving a plan, fear requires some awareness that one will continue into the future. Since Gordon Gallup's pioneering experiments, self-recognition with mirrors has often been cited as evidence of self-awareness in animals.

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Metadata

Authors
DeGrazia, D.
Affiliations
George Washington University (US)
Corresponding author
DeGrazia, David
ORCID
DeGrazia, David
Venue
The Philosophy of Animal Minds
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2009-09-03
Pages
201-217
DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511819001.012
OpenAlex
W1630360875
Cited by
115
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 6 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 1
FWCI
6.21
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 1006 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Primate Behavior and Ecology
Keywords
animal self-awareness, mirror self-recognition, propositional attitudes, intentional action, body awareness, animal preferences, animal cognition, tool use, problem solving, fear, persistence of the self

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