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Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations
Abstract
This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the argument is to suggest that the theory of rational choice is less deterministic than many suppose.
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Citations
Cited by
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2008) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00848.x · Cited by 984
Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy
Sugden, R. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233854 · Cited by 450
Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction
Colman, A. M. (2003) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x03000050 · Cited by 428
Bovens, L. (2009) · Preference Change · doi:10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_10 · Cited by 411
Metadata
- Authors
- McClennen, E. F.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1990-05-25
- OpenAlex
- W175681799
- Cited by
- 468
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.59
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511983979
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- McClennen, E. F. (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511983979
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.