The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Rent-seeking as Process
Open accessAbstract
So far in our analysis of rents, we have looked only at the implications of the rents themselves and not at the implications of the processes through which rents are created or maintained. In fact, since rents are, by definition, beneficial for the recipients, they are likely to spend resources to create, maintain or transfer particular rents. Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources and effort in creating, maintaining or transferring rents . These expenditures can be legal, as with most forms of lobbying, queuing, or contributions to political parties. But they can also be illegal, as in the case of bribes, illegal political contributions, expenditures on private mafias, and so on. The processes are of tremendous significance because the resources they use up are a social cost, and they determine the types of rents which are created and maintained in a particular society. Conventional rent-seeking theory, however, assumes that rent-seeking only results in the creation or protection of monopoly rents, and, in addition, it makes restrictive assumptions about how the rent-seeking cost is determined. Nevertheless, the contribution of this theory was to tell us that the cost of rent-seeking was an additional cost of maintaining a monopoly. However, the conventional rent-seeking framework has to be radically extended if it is to be relevant for the real world. Institutional economics and political economy both suggest directions in which the rent-seeking framework can be extended.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Palma, J. G. (2011) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01694.x · Cited by 514
Governance, Economic Growth and Development Since the 1960s
(2007) · UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers · doi:10.18356/9156b122-en · Cited by 168
Self-citationFossil fuel subsidy reform, rent management and political fragmentation in developing countries
Lockwood, M. (2015) · New Political Economy · doi:10.1080/13563467.2014.923826 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Khan, M. H.
- Venue
- Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-07
- Pages
- 70-144
- OpenAlex
- W1509797890
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.05
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rent-seeking as Process. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139085052.003
- The paper
- Khan, M. H. (2000). Rent-seeking as Process. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139085052.003
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.