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Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit

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· 1996 · Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Cited by 393

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Abstract

A person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences. Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophers, however, characteristically place a different emphasis on these two aspects of our nature. The utilitarian emphasizes the passive side of our nature, our capacity to be pleased or satisfied, and is concerned with what happens to us. The Kantian emphasizes our agency, and is concerned with what we do. Alternatively, we may say that the utilitarian focuses first on persons as objects of moral concern, and asks, “what should be done for them?” whereas the Kantian addresses the moral agent, who is asking, “what should I do?” One might think that this can only be a difference of emphasis. Any acceptable moral philosophy must take both sides of our nature into account, and tell us both how people ought to be treated and what we ought to do. Yet the difference of emphasis can lead to substantive moral disagreement. Kantians believe in what are sometimes called “agent-centered” restrictions, obligations which are independent of the value of the outcomes they produce. Even when thinking of persons as objects of moral concern, the Kantian is more likely to focus on agency. The question “what should be done for them?” is answered, roughly, by “they should be given the freedom to make their own choices, and to do things for themselves.” Rawls believes that asking the agentless “what should be done for them?” leads to distortion in the utilitarian view of moral and political decision.

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Metadata

Venue
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Published
1996-07-28
Pages
363-398
OpenAlex
W1524687075
Cited by
393
References
0
FWCI
104.19
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139174503.014
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Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139174503.014

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