The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis
Abstract
Various analysts have noted that the decision to vote in mass elections is difficult to justify from the standpoint of an expected utility maximization model. Put simply, the probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome is so small that the expected gains from voting are outweighed by the costs in time and effort. Such analyses treat rational behavior as synonymous with expected utility maximization. In this paper we show that an alternative criterion for decision making under uncertainty, minimax regret, specifies voting under quite general conditions. Both two and three candidate plurality elections are considered. Interestingly, a minimax regret decision maker never votes for his second choice in a three candidate election, whereas expected utility maximizers clearly may. Thus, the model proposed has implications for candidate choice as well as turnout.
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Citations
Cites
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Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964
Kramer, G. H. (1971) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955049 · Cited by 1,596
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Sociologists, Economists and Democracy
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Sociologists, Economists and Democracy.
McPherson, W., & Barry, B. M. (1971) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2093734 · Cited by 329
Toward a Mathematics of Politics, by Gordon Tullock
Bernd, J. L. (1970) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2147568 · Cited by 282
Cited by
Aldrich, J. H. (1993) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111531 · Cited by 1,203
“Relational goods” and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action
Uhlaner, C. J. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf02337745 · Cited by 465
Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation
Leighley, J. E. (1995) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591299504800111 · Cited by 462
Ethnicity and electoral politics
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-7072 · Cited by 364
Cain, B. E. (1978) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110465 · Cited by 318
Metadata
- Authors
- Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1974-06-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 525-536
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2000927375
- Cited by
- 578
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 26.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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