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A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies
Abstract
I argue that information and trust in nascent democratic institutions are two important sources of heterogeneity in economic voting in transition democracies. Economic voting develops in postcommunist electorates as ambiguity regarding the link between government policy and economic outcomes declines. The link becomes less ambiguous as citizens become more informed about how democratic institutions function and gain increasing confidence or trust in the responsiveness of these institutions to public preferences. In the early period of democratization the conditions necessary for an effective agency relationship between voter and incumbent are not yet fully developed. Economic voting increases as these levels of information on, and trust in, government rise. The analysis that tests these propositions is based on a public opinion survey conducted in Hungary in 1997. The test is replicated with a 1997 Polish election survey.
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Cites
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Zaller, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818691 · Cited by 7,785
Cited by
Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective
Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W. T., & Moreno, C. (2005) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0002 · Cited by 580
Torcal, M. (2014) · Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.891598 · Cited by 65
Metadata
- Authors
- Duch, R. M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-12
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 895-910
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2337173903
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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